Making progress in Northern Ireland? Evidence from recent elections by Knox, Colin & Carmichael, Paul
Colin Knox and Paul Carmichael 
Making Progress in Northern Ireland? 
Evidence from Recent Elections 
THE ELECTION OF 582 COUNCILLORS TO NORTHERN IRELAND’S 26 
local authorities on 21 May 1997 was eclipsed, to a large extent, by 
the media focus on the General Election earlier that month (1 May). 
That little attention is paid to the only elected forum with executive 
powers in Northern Ireland is neither new nor surprising. Councils 
in the province have relatively few functional responsibilities, 
confined principally to the delivery of regulatory services (street 
cleaning, refuse collection, leisure and tourism and a limited role 
in economic development); representation on area boards which 
deliver major services such as education; and a consultative role in 
relation to planning, roads, water and housing which are delivered 
through ‘Next Steps’ agencies or similar arm’s-length organizations. 
This minor role is reflected in the level of council budgets. In 1997/ 
98, the estimated net expenditure for local government in Northern 
Ireland amounts to E230 million, approximately three per cent of 
identifiable public expenditure.’ 
None the less, local government in Northern Ireland has a 
significance beyond the election process. Its raison d’itre as a tier of 
government owes much to the abuse of power by councils prior to 
local government reorganization in October 1973 and unionist 
hegemony in Northern Ireland’s devolved (Stormont) Parliament 
from 1921 to 1972.’ Since then, in the absence of any other 
democratic executive forum. council chambers have become the 
I Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland, Local Government 
Division, District Council (NI) Rate Statistics Tables, 1997-98, Belfast, Department of 
the Environment (NI), 1997. 
J. McGarry and B.O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images, Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1995; J. Whyte, ‘How much discrimination was there under the Unionist 
Regime 192 1-68?’, in T.Gallagher and J. O’Connell (eds) Contemporary Irish Studies: 
1-35, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1983; J. Whyte, Interpreting Northern 
Ireland, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990. 
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mechanism for the expression of political opinions, sometimes 
vitriolic and often well beyond the ambit of their direct powers. 
The system of Direct Rule, imposed under the Northern Ireland 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1972, has created a ‘democratic deficit’ 
whereby the Secretary of State (currently, MO Mowlam), a 
Westminster cabinet member, has direction and control of the 
Northern Ireland Office and six civil service departments which 
operate in the social and economic fields.% Senior civil servants are 
responsible to a ministerial team whose constituency base is in Great 
Britain with no electoral accountability to the citizens of Northern 
Ireland. In these circumstances, the role of local councillors assumes 
an importance beyond the narrow confines of their direct 
responsibilities and they frequently mediate between constituents 
and central service providers over issues of housing, planning and, 
in particular, social security. Finally, any future political accommoda- 
tion in Northern Ireland, arising from the recent multi-party agree- 
ment, will involve a reassessment of the role of local government. 
It is for these reasons that councils in Northern Ireland are worthy 
of academic scrutiny. An examination of local government elections, 
in particular, offers a more detailed analysis of underlying political 
movements than either Westminster or European elections, or 
indeed, the Forum election of June 1996. This article will therefore 
consider the political context within which the 1997 Northern 
Ireland local government elections took place, the election campaign 
and results, and present an evaluation of the ensuing political 
changes both within councils and, more broadly, possible 
consequences for future macro political developments. 
’The Secretary of State, the Rt Hon Dr Marjorie Mowlam MP was appointed 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on 3 May 1997. She has direction and control 
of the Northern Ireland Office whose responsibilities include political, constitutional, 
security and criminal justice matters; and of six Northern Ireland departments - 
agriculture, economic development, education, environment, finance and personnel, 
and health and social security. The Secretary of State is assisted by fourjunior ministers 
(Paul Murphy, Adam Ingram, Tony Worthington and Lord Dubs) who have day-to- 
day responsibility for particular areas of work. The Secretary of State and her colleagues 
are answerable to Parliament in London for the discharge of their functions. 
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MACRO POLITICAL CONTEXT 
Any discussion of the 1997 local government elections would be 
vacuous without first considering the wider political landscape within 
which councils operate. Since the previous local government 
elections in 1993, several important developments had taken place. 
The inter-party political talks, set up in 1991, to find a means by 
which substantial power and responsibility might be transferred to 
locally elected representatives, were bogged down in procedural and 
substantive   rang ling.^ When they eventually foundered, the then 
British Prime Minister Uohn Major) and the Irish Taoiseach (Albert 
Reynolds) seized the initiative and issued a joint communique, the 
Downing Street Declaration (December 1993). The Joint Declaration 
set out the constitutional principles and political realities which 
would safeguard the vital interests of both communities in Northern 
Ireland. The British government reiterated Northern Ireland’s 
statutory constitutional guarantee and reaffirmed its commitment 
to uphold the democratic wish of the greater number of people to 
support the Union or a sovereign United Ireland. The Irish 
government accepted that the right of self determination by the 
people of Ireland as a whole must be achieved and exercised with, 
and subject to, the agreement and consent of a majority of the people 
of Northern Ireland (Joint Declaration, 15 December 1993, 
Northern Ireland Office). The Joint Declaration, set alongside a 
flurry of secret discussions that included an unpublished peace plan 
agreed between the SDLP and Sinn Fein, acted as a catalyst for the 
first IRA cease-fire and prompted the Framework Documents. 
On 31 August 1994, the IRA announced their ‘complete cessation 
of military operations’, followed by the Loyalists’ cease-fire 
announcement on 13 October 1994. This allowed the government 
to move towards exploratory dialogue with Sinn Fein and Loyalist 
representatives. In the case of the former, this centred on how they 
might be admitted to inclusive talks. For both groups, it concerned 
how they could play a full role in the normal political life of Northern 
’ Talks between the main constitutional parties were brokered by the then Secretary 
of State (Peter Brooke) and commenced in March 1991. They proceeded in three 
‘strands’ (British government and main NI parties; relationship between the people 
of Ireland; and the relationship between the British and Irish governments). The talks 
closed in November 1992 without agreement but a series of bilateral discussions with 
constitutional parties began in September 1993. 
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Ireland, as well as the practical consequences of ending violence. A 
series of confidence-building measures was introduced to build upon 
the climate of opportunity for peace-building which prevailed. These 
included, inter alia, lifting the broadcasting ban on supporters of 
terrorist organizations, rescinding exclusion orders, and legislation 
enacted allowing the release of fixed-term terrorist prisoners, subject 
to continued good behaviour, once half of the sentence was served. 
To assist multilateral dialogue and agreement towards an overall 
political settlement, the British and Irish governments published 
‘Frameworks for the Future’ (February 1995). The document, whilst 
not offered as a blueprint, outlined what an overall settlement might 
look like and represented a shared understanding of the elements 
likely to offer the best prospects of broad support across the 
community in Northern Ireland. Proposals included the establish- 
ment of a 90-member assembly elected by proportional representa- 
tion, and a system of checks and balances intended to sustain the 
confidence of both communities in the proposed new institutions. 
The Irish government, for its part, proposed changes to its consti- 
tution (the controversial articles 2 and 3) removing anyjurisdictional 
or territorial claim of legal right over Northern Ireland contrary to 
the will of the people. 
Political progress remained elusive however, and the government 
did not judge that there was sufficient confidence for all-party 
negotiations in the absence of any significant progress on the 
decommissioning of terrorist arms. To break the impasse, the 
government set out the principles5 against which they would judge 
the sincerity of the Loyalist and Republican parties to embrace 
democratic politics. The paramilitaries refused to disarm in advance 
of talks and in November 1995, the two governments launched the 
Twin Track Initiative aimed at creating the confidence necessary 
for substantive all-party negotiations to begin by the end of February 
1996. The initiative established an international body (the Mitchell 
Commission) to examine the decommissioning of illegal arms and 
The three principles were: 
- show a willingness in principle to disarm progressively; 
- develop a common practical understanding of the modalities, i.e. to say what 
decommissioning actually entails; 
- in order to test the practical arrangements, and to demonstrate good faith, 
decommission some arms as a tangible confidence-building measure and to signal 
the start of the process. 
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a parallel phase of preparatory talks designed to examine the basis, 
participation, structure, format and agenda for all-party negotiations. 
The Mitchell Commission (January 1996) reaffirmed that paramili- 
taries would not disarm and, as an alternative, set out a series of 
principles to which all parties to talks would have to subscribe. The 
British government reacted by sidestepping the major thrust of the 
Commission’s findings, seizing instead upon a relatively minor 
confidence-building measure in the report, namely, an elected 
assembly to provide a mandate for talks without prior decom- 
missioning. 
Soon afterwards (February 1996), the IRA ended its cease-fire 
with the Canary Wharf bomb in London. Nationalists (SDLP and 
Sinn Fein) accused the British government of ‘political mugging’ 
and pandering to Unionists in an effort to prop up their dwindling 
majority in the House of Commons. In so doing, they had squand- 
ered the respite in violence and dragged their heels on political 
progress. Unionists (the UUP and DUP) felt vindicated in refusing 
to join round-table talks in advance of decommissioning terrorist 
weapons. 
Within days of the London bombing, a flurry of activity by the 
British and Irish governments produced a consensus on future 
progress. A firm date (10 June 1996) was set for the start of all- 
party negotiations, following an elective process to a new 110-strong 
‘Peace’ Forum. However, it was stressed that Sinn Fein could not 
participate in the talks until there was an unequivocal restoration 
of the IRA cease-fire. 
The Forum’s brief was deliberative only, specifically to promote 
dialogue, understanding and consensus across the communities of 
Northern Ireland (but with no power to determine the conduct, 
course or outcome of the negotiations). Teams were nominated from 
the parties elected to the Forum to engage in multi-party talks. After 
their inception in June 1996, progress in the talks, the proceedings 
of which are generally confidential, was extremely slow. Considerable 
time was spent agreeing rules of procedure in the tense atmosphere 
surrounding the parades at Drumcree (July 1996) and the issue of 
decommissioning dogged proceedings prior to the Westminster and 
local government elections in 1997, by which point no agreement 
had been reached on the issue. When the talks reconvened under a 
new Labour government Uune 1997), a decommissioning plan 
setting out the structures and mechanism for dealing with this 
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problem, involving an independent commission, was launched 
simultaneously with the start of substantive negotiations in 
September. The British government, under the legislation, did not 
want the talks to continue beyond May 1998 and required a settle- 
ment by that stage. 
In the meantime, the IRA unexpectedly announced the ‘unequi- 
vocal restoration of the cease-fire of August 1994’ effective from 20 
July 1997. This, according to Sinn Fein, resulted from their demands 
being met by the new Labour government. These are that 
- Sinn Fein would be admitted to all-party talks on the same basis 
as other parties; 
- those talks would be completed within a fixed time frame, 
preferably six months; 
- the government would not require decommissioning of weapons 
before or during negotiations; 
- confidence-building measures would be introduced after the 
cease-fire, such as relaxing security policy and the regime in prisons. 
The unionists remained deeply suspicious of Sinn Fein’s motives 
and suspected the IRA of calling a tactical cease-fire only. 
The discussions in the three strands proceeded until January 1998 
when the two governments tabled a set of propositions on heads of 
agreement outlining a possible settlement. Detailed discussions 
followed in the light of this document with agreement being reached 
on 10 April 1998 (Good Friday). The Agreement was ratified in a 
referendum on 22 May 1998. A majority of 676,966 voted ‘Yes’ 
(71.12 per cent) and 2’74,879 voted ‘No’ (28.88 per cent). The turnout 
was exceptionally high at 951,845 (80.9 per cent). Elections to the 
new Assembly follow on 25 June 1998. 
LOCAL POLITICAL CONTEXT 
Local government as an elected forum is not impervious to the 
vagaries of macro political developments or lack thereof. Equally, 
the developments within local government can and do have a bearing 
on the wider Northern Ireland conflict, with the balance of evidence 
over time pointing increasingly to a generally benign influence. 
Councils in Northern Ireland, despite their limited functions, 
suffered from a very negative political image during the mid-1980s. 
The election of Sinn Fein to councils for the first time in 1985 
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Table 1 
Northern Ireland Local Government Elections since 19 73  
Percentage Share of Poll by Political Party 
Year UUP DUP 1ND.U PUP/UDP APNI SDLP SFein Con 0 t h  
1973 41.4 4.3 10.9 13.7 13.4 16.3 
1977 29.6 12.7 8.5 14.4 20.6 13.2 
1981 26.5 26.6 4.2 8.9 17.5 15.3 
1985 29.5 24.3 3.1 7.1 13.4 11.8 5.8 
1989 31.4 17.7 3.9 6.8 21.2 11.2 1.1 7.0 
1993 29.3 17.2 2.7 7.7 21.9 12.5 1.5 7.2 
1997 27.8 15.6 2.5 2.2/1 6.6 20.7 16.9 1.0 5.7 
Key to Political Parties: 
UUP: Ulster Unionist Party 
DUP: Democratic Unionist Party 
1ND.U: Independent Unionists (assorted individuals) 
PUP/UDP: Progressive Unionist Party/Ulster Democratic Party (fringe 
loyalists) 
APNI: Alliance Party 
SDLP: Social Democratic and Labour Party 
SFein: Sinn Fein 
Con: Conservative Party 
0 th :  Others (assorted individuals) 
Table 2 
Northern Ireland Local Government Elections Since 1977 
Seats Gained by Political Party 
Year UUP DUP APNI SDLP SFein 0 t h  
1977 175 71 70 114 96 
1981 151 142 38 103 92 
1985 190 142 34 101 59 40 
1989 191 110 38 121 43 63 
1993 197 103 44 127 51 60 
1997 185 91 41 120 74 71 
TOTAL 
526 
526 
566 
566 
582 
582 
Key to political parties: 
UUP: Ulster Unionist Party 
DUP: Democratic Unionist Party 
APNI: Alliance Party 
SDLP: Social Democratic and Labour Party 
SFein: Sinn Fein 
0 t h :  Others (assorted individuals) 
caused a furore amongst unionists who reacted with a ‘smash Sinn 
Fein’ campaign aimed at isolating their councillors through exclusion 
from committees and filibustering tactics. Unionists also demanded 
that Sinn Fein councillors be compelled to sign a declaration against 
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violence but this was challenged in the courts and declared illegal. 
However, these protests were superseded by a campaign of 
opposition, waged by unionists, against the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
(November 1985). Arguing that to administer local government was 
to give tacit support to the London-Dublin partnership, unionists 
adjourned all council meetings and refused to strike a district rate. 
The minister responsible took powers to appoint commissioners 
and empower council officials to carry out functions. Cracks, how- 
ever, began to appear in the unionist protest campaign. A mass 
resignation proposal, aimed at all Ulster Unionist (UUP) and 
Democratic Unionist (DUP) councillors, was rejected. Some protest 
authorities met to strike a rate for the financial year 1987-88, and 
accusations abounded of surreptitious business taking place in 
unionist councils. Services continued to be provided amidst fears 
that nationalist councils were obtaining additional resources through 
regular ministerial contact. The protest withered to an inauspicious 
end.6 
The results of the local government elections of 1989 marked a 
turning-point in council chambers with a degree of moderation not 
unrelated to the decline in representation from the political extremes 
(see Tables 1 and 2). From this stable political environment an 
experiment in ‘responsibility sharing” developed between the main 
nationalist and unionist parties, the SDLP and UUP respectively. 
The horrific carnage, even by Northern Ireland’s standards, of the 
Remembrance Day bombing in Enniskillen (November 1987) also 
appears to have had a profound impact on local politicians by 
fostering a climate of accommodation hitherto lacking. The process 
was consolidated by the 1993 local election results. In part, this 
reflects the psychological impact of the ‘numbers game’, a factor 
that cannot be overstated in Northern Ireland. The paradox of the 
M. Connolly and C. Knox, ‘Recent Political Difficulties of Local Government in 
Northern Ireland’, Policy and Politics, 16:2 (1988), pp. 89-97; C. Knox, ‘Sinn Fein and 
Local Elections: The Government’s Response in Northern Ireland’, Parliamentary 
Affairs, 43:4 (1990), pp. 448-63; C. Knox, ‘The 1989 Local Elections in Northern 
Ireland’, Irish Political Studies, 5 (1990), pp. 77-84. 
’ This term evolved in deference to Unionist sensitivities over the use of the words 
‘power-sharing’. Dungannon District Council is credited with leading the way in rotating 
the council chair between the two main political parties, the SDLP and UUP, although 
some councils (mainly nationalist-controlled) claim to have been doing this for years 
in a less high-profile manner. 
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double minority is well known (that is, a Protestant minority in 
Ireland as a whole, but a Catholic minority in Northern Ireland). 
To this can be added the third case, that of a Protestant minority 
west of the River Bann, which bisects Northern Ireland. As one 
councillor remarked: 
the unionists should have regard to the fact that in 1993, the majority of 
votes in Cookstown [a council west of the Bann] were non-unionist votes 
and it is only by accident [that is, the mechanics of the STV electoral 
system] that they have a majority on the council. Now the fact that they 
didn’t share all down the years raises a question mark over whether or 
not their conversion is complete but I do honestly believe that many of 
them are sincere about achieving better relations, although there could 
be an element of keeping an eye to the future when they know the boot is 
going to be on the other foot. (Private interview.) 
This new rapprochement between political parties was also reflected 
in an improvement in central-local relations. As local authorities 
demonstrated a willingness to undertake their role in what central 
government saw as a constructive manner, additional responsibilities 
were delegated to councils. Three important new functions are 
illustrative of the emergence of local government from the political 
wilderness, namely, economic development, community relations 
and partnerships. 
First, in the field of economic development, local authorities were 
traditionally incidental players, their involvement being limited to 
making contributions to any voluntary body which developed trade, 
industry and commerce in their area or, more generally, for further- 
ing ‘the interests of the council, its district or inhabitants’ (section 
115, Local Government Act 1972). Total payments were limited to 
threepence in the pound on the rateable value of the district.8 Since 
1992, however, councils have been permitted to spend up to five 
pence in the pound from rates for the specific purpose of economic 
development. Although modest when compared with the budgets 
of central government agencies (the Industrial Development Board 
and Local Economic Development Unit) with the same 
responsibility, councils have been innovative in its usage. They have 
Local government in Northern Ireland has not been the subject of rates reform 
experienced by councils in Great Britain in the late 1980s which heralded the much 
criticized community charge and subsequent council tax. For a detailed description 
of the comparison between Northern Ireland local government finance and the rest 
of the United Kingdom see R. R. Barnett and C. Knox, ‘Accountability and Local 
Budgetary Policy: Unitary Principles?’, Policy and Politics, 20:4 (1992), pp. 265-76. 
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established extensive networks with private companies, set up arm’s- 
length enterprise facilities and used their limited resources as seed- 
corn finance or matching grants to tap into larger EC funding 
s o ~ r c e s . ~  
Secondly, local councils have acquired a growing prominence in 
the field of community development and community relations. In 
1989, the Central Community Relations Unit (CCRU)’O invited 
councils to participate in a community relations programme aimed 
at developing cross-community contact and cooperation between 
the two communities, promoting greater mutual understanding, 
and increasing respect for different cultural traditions. The pro- 
gramme attracted a 75 per cent grant-aid from central government 
to employ community relations officers within councils and imple- 
ment programmes of activity congruent with the above objectives. 
All 26 councils joined the initiative which was subsequently judged 
a useful community-based approach to micro conflict management.” 
Given the conditions associated with joining the initiative (e.g. 
agreement on a cross-party basis to participate), vesting responsibility 
for community relations in local councils was, from a government 
perspective, a way of promoting consensus at the political level and, 
by example, in the community. An active involvement in this area 
by councils, given their chequered history of discrimination and 
sectarianism, has added to the emerging climate of cross-party 
cooperation and stability and demonstrated a more responsible 
approach to an incremental increase in devolved powers. 
Thirdly, and most recently, local authorities have become major 
brokers in partnership arrangements designed to deliver European- 
funded service programmes. In 1995, the European Community 
launched a Special Programme for Peace and Reconciliation, a 300 
MECU package designed to reinforce progress towards a peaceful 
and stable society following the IRA and Loyalists’ cease-fires. 
Additional funding of 100 MECU (in January 1998) brought the 
total programme allocation for the four-year period 1995-98 to some 
C. Knox, ‘Local Government in Northern Ireland?, Ulster Papers in Public Policy 
and Management, No. 62,  1996. 
CCRU is a dedicated unit within the Central Secretariat of the Northern Ireland 
Office charged with formulating, reviewing and challenging policy throughout the 
government system with the aim of improving community relations. 
It J. Hughes and C. Knox, ‘For Better or Worse? Community Relations in Northern 
Ireland’, Peace and Change, 223 (1997), pp. 330-55. 
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400 MECU (2280m). District partnerships, representing each of 
the council areas, and comprising local councillors, community/ 
voluntary representatives, business and trade union interests, 
and statutory organizations approve action plans for local activities 
to advance the objectives of the programme. Thus far, district 
partnerships appear to have harnessed the emerging goodwill 
in local authorities, mobilized an apathetic business sector into 
taking ownership of social goals and energized the voluntary sector 
which has played a vital role in community development. Faced 
with a constitutional impasse, local authorities have acted as a 
pivotal broker in partnership arrangements for delivering public 
services. 
THE ELECTORAL CONTEXT 
To set the local government elections in context, it is worth 
considering the electoral performance of the main political parties 
both in the Forum elections (referred to above) and the Westminster 
elections on 30 May 1996 and 1 May 1997 respectively (see Figure 
1).  Northern Ireland has a range of electoral systems. Elections to 
the so-called Peace Forum used a list system organized in the 
eighteen parliamentary constituencies, but not by single transferable 
vote, supplemented by Northern Ireland-wide party preference. 
The Westminster elections use the single-member plurality or ‘first- 
past-the-post’ system for eighteen parliamentary seats, and the 
European elections use the single transferable vote system of 
proportional representation in which the whole of Northern Ireland 
forms one three-member constituency. 
This system of voting emerged when the main political parties failed to agree 
on the type of electoral system to be used for the new Forum. The government therefore 
decided on a list system (but on a constituency basis) supplemented by NI-wide party 
preference. Five representatives were elected from each of the eighteen parliamentary 
constituencies, but not by PR/STV. Voters cast a single vote for the party of their 
choice on the ballot paper and party representatives were elected in each constituency 
in proportion to a party’s vote. In each constituency, parties nominated, in advance, 
a list of named candidates who would constitute their representatives if elected. The 
votes cast for each party were also aggregated across Northern Ireland and the ten 
most successful parties, in addition, secured two elected representatives from 
candidates nominated for this purpose in advance. 
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The 1996 Forum elections were called by the government, hoping 
for a consensus to emerge in advance of all-party talks. Instead of 
undermining Sinn Fein, as the government had anticipated, the 
party’s standing, in propaganda terms as well as votes, was greatly 
enhanced with a record share of the vote (15.5 per cent). Without 
an IRA cease-fire the party, however, would not be admitted to the 
negotiations making it impossible to initiate all-party talks. Unlike 
other elections, this one did not represent a battle between the 
SDLP and Sinn Fein for nationalist supremacy (except under- 
standably in West Belfast). Although the SDLP polled a credible 
21.4 per cent of the votes, there was some voting slippage to Sinn 
Fein. The DUP vote held up well (18.8 per cent) and endorsed the 
party’s message that it wanted no part of a peace process which 
included Sinn Fein, even if it were to agree to parallel decom- 
missioning. The UUP, the largest party in the Forum, fared better 
than expected (24.2 per cent) under its new leader David Trimble 
in the face of other pro-union candidates, specifically the UK 
Unionists (3.7 per cent) and fringe loyalist parties, the Progressive 
Unionist Party and Ulster Democratic Party (5.7 per cent). In a clear 
reference to the latter, the UUP demanded to know its stance on 
terrorism and decommissioning of terrorist weaponry to ensure 
only those committed to peaceful means and the democratic process 
were admitted to talks. In short, the outstanding feature of the Forum 
elections remained the increased poll for Sinn Fein and the failure 
to divert the pro-union vote away from both the UUP and DUP. 
The two extremes on the political spectrum were heavily endorsed 
with the moderate Alliance Party (6.5 per cent) becoming a victim 
of a no transfers election. The government’s intentions were snubbed 
by the electorate for what it perceived as prevarication and obduracy 
during the seventeen months’ cease-fire period. 
The Westminster elections of May 1997 saw further gains by Sinn 
Fein to a record level of electoral support (from 10 to 16.1 per cent) 
and its advance to become the third largest political party (replacing 
the DUP) in Northern Ireland (behind the UUP and SDLP). Two 
celebrated victories by Sinn Fein leaders (Martin McGuinness and 
Gerry Adams) in Mid-Ulster and West Belfast changed the political 
map at the expense of the DUP and SDLP respectively (ousting 
William McCrea and Joe Hendron). Inside unionism, the UUP 
increased its representation by taking the newly created West Tyrone 
seat. Although the UUP emerged as the dominant political party 
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with an increased number of Westminster seats (from nine to ten), 
its share of the vote decreased (from 34.5 to 32.7 per cent). 
Conversely, the DUP’s vote improved slightly (from 13.1 to 13.6 per 
cent), but the loss in one seat (from three to two) especially to Sinn 
Fein, its avowed political enemy, was a major disappointment for 
the party. Within nationalism, the SDLP’s vote remained solid (from 
23.5 to 24.1 per cent) but, here again, the loss of West Belfast to 
Sinn Fein was a major electoral blow and decreased its Westminster 
representation (from four to three seats). Sinn Fein’s share of the 
nationalist vote changed significantly from a 30:70 split (Sinn Fein: 
SDLP) in 1992 to 40:60 in 1997. Among the other parties, the UK 
Unionists (Robert McCartney) held North Down and the Alliance 
Party’s vote decreased marginally (8.7 to 8 per cent) but once again 
they failed to gain a seat. Overall, nationalist voters had reasoned 
that strengthening Sinn Fein’s electoral mandate was more likely to 
deliver peace than prolong violence. This, in turn, put pressure on 
the government to engage Sinn Fein in some way, official or 
unofficial, in talks. One psephologist assessing the elections 
commented: ‘the results raised the question of whether there was 
now any ceiling to the Sinn Fein vote.’’J It is against this background 
that the 1997 local government elections took place, less than three 
weeks later. 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS (2 1 MAY 1997) 
Elections to local councils in Northern Ireland occur every four 
years using the single transferable vote system of proportional 
representation. The previous elections in 1993 had produced little 
by way of change in the local electoral landscape (see Tables 1 and 
2). The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) remained the largest political 
party in councils, the Democratic Unionist Party’s (DUP) vote 
share, despite expectations to the contrary, declined only 
marginally, and the combined nationalist vote of the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Fein recorded its 
highest level of support. The SDLP consolidated its position as 
the leading nationalist party and Sinn Fein halted a post-1985 
decline in its electoral performance. Seventeen councils were 
” S. Elliott, ‘Changes’, Fortnight, 9-10 June 1997. 
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controlled by a combined unionist bloc, six by nationalists and 
three hung  council^.'^ 
The 1997 local elections saw 1,100 candidates contesting 582 seats 
in 26 council areas. A degree of election fatigue had set in with 
both the Forum and Westminster elections within the previous twelve 
months and three weeks respectively. The elections were seen, as 
ever in Northern Ireland, as a case of two contests within each 
community. The Ulster Unionist Party would attempt to extend its 
lead over the DUP, and Sinn Fein’s significantly improving electoral 
strength would be tested by the SDLP. The political environment 
for the elections can best be described as intransigence and 
continuing violence: the political vacuum of multi-party talks 
apparently going nowhere; Sinn Fein’s exclusion from the political 
process; and, ongoing IRA and loyalist violence, despite claims by 
the latter that their cease-fire remained intact. At the local level, 
however, the efforts of twelve of the 26 councils to engage, to varying 
degrees, in power sharing appeared to be at odds with the stalemate 
politics of the centre. 
Party political positions on local government remained fairly 
predictable. Unionist parties demanded the restoration of powers 
to councils in a devolved system of administration, whilst nationalists 
implacably opposed any such change in the absence of an agreed 
overall constitutional settlement within which the role of local 
government would feature as one component (the idea that ‘nothing 
is agreed until everything is agreed’). The SDLP had, however, placed 
itself in an incongruous position as the prime mover in power- 
sharing arrangements within councils, the direct result of which 
had been an improved image for local government and an increase 
in calls for greater powers. The Alliance Party also opposed any 
return of powers to local government, seeing such a move as a 
distraction from achieving agreement on shared institutions at the 
Northern Ireland-wide level. 
Pre-election interest centred on the marginal unionist controlled 
councils of Belfast, Strabane and Fermanagh; nationalist Limavady 
and Magherafelt; and ‘hung’ Dungannon. Because of the symbolic 
importance of Belfast City Council, generally perceived as a bastion 
l4 P. Carmichael, ‘The 1993 Local Government Elections in Northern Ireland’, 
Irish Political Studies, 9 (1994), pp. 141-7. 
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Table 3 
Northern Ireland Local Government Elections May 1997 
Number of Seats by Political party 
District UDP PUP DUP UKU UUP APNI SDLP SFein 0 t h  Total 
Antrim 
Ards 
Armagh 
Ballymena 
Ballymoney 
Banbridge 
Belfast 1 
Carrickfergus 
Castlereagh 
Coleraine 
Cookstown 
Craigavon 
Derry 
Down 
Dungannon 
Fermanagh 
Lame 
Limavady 
Lisburn 2 
Magherafelt 
Moyle 
Newry Mourne 
Newtownabbey 1 
North Down 
Omagh 
Strabane 
3 9 2  4 1  19 
5 10 5 1 2 23 
2 10 7 3 22 
8 11 1 3 1 24 
6 4 3 1 2 1 6  
3 9 3 2 17 
3 7  13 6 7 13 1 51 
3 4 5  5 17 
1 0 1 5 4  2 1 23 
5 10 3 3 1 22 
2 4 4 5 1 1 6  
3 11 1 7 2 2 2 6  
4 3 14 8 1 30 
2 6 12 2 1 23 
3 8 4 5 2 2 2  
2 9 4 5 3 2 3  
3 6 1  1 4 15 
1 6 7 1  15 
2 13 3 2 4 4 3 0  
3 3 5 5  16 
3 3 3 1 5 1 5  
1 5 12 8 4 30 
1 2  10 3 1 7 25 
2 2 3 6 6  6 25 
3 4 1  6 6 1 2 1  
3 3 5 4  1 16 
TOTAL, 4 6 91 4 185 41 120 74 57 582 
Resultunder 6 13 91 3 162 38 120 98 51 582 
strict PR 
1993 Result 103 197 44 127 51 60 582 
Key to Political Parties: 
UUP: Ulster Unionist Party 
DUP: Democratic Unionist Party 
UKU: United Kingdom Unionists 
PUP/UDP: Progressive Unionist Party/Ulster Democratic Party (fringe 
loyalists) 
APNI: Alliance Party 
SDLP: Social Democratic and Labour Party 
SFein: Sinn Fein 
0th:  Others (assorted individuals) 
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of unionism and the largest council by far in Northern Ireland,I5 
much media focus was on whether the city could have the first 
nationalist mayor in its history. Although each election in Northern 
Ireland is a repeat referendum on the constitutional preference of 
whether voters wish to remain within the United Kingdom, local 
issues emerged during the campaign. These tended to reflect specific 
parochial concerns and ranged from Sunday opening of leisure 
facilities (Cookstown), pedestrianization of the town centre (Antrim), 
parades (Craigavon and Ballymena), selling-off a council-owned arts 
centre (Down), siting of a community hospital (North Down), and 
a proposed superdump (Larne). Many issues of expressed local 
concern were often outside the remit of councils which could do 
little more than lobby appropriate government ministers, civil 
servants and statutory agencies. 
The results of the elections highlighted a number of important 
political developments. Perhaps most significant was the size and 
complexion of the turnout (down from 54.7 per cent in 1993 to 
53.77 per cent). Across the province, turnout tended to fall from 
west to east. Areas with more evenly balanced religious compositions 
(largely, in the west) recorded greater levels of voter activity (since 
every vote counts) than those which are predominantly Catholic or 
Protestant. For example, in Cookstown (with a fairly mixed 
population in terms of religious composition), one electoral division 
recorded a turnout of 83.38 per cent. By contrast, in North Down 
(overwhelmingly Protestant), one electoral division recorded a figure 
of only 30 per cent. Interestingly, in Belfast, turnout in over- 
whelmingly Catholic areas (such as Lower Falls, at 65.59 per cent) 
was considerably higher than in overwhelmingly Protestant ones 
(such as Pottinger, at 49.68 per cent). The divergence in turnout 
levels between predominantly Catholic and predominantly Protestant 
areas was significant. Simply, the sharp decline in unionist support, 
the unchecked growth of Sinn Fein’s vote (see Tables 1 and 2), a 
surge in the numbers of nationalists coming out to vote, and the 
emergence of fringe loyalist parties as significant local political forces 
l5 Belfast City Council has a population (1995) of 296,300 and an estimated net 
expenditure (1997/98) of f61.5m. This compares with Lisburn Borough Council, 
the second largest council, whose population is 103,600 and expenditure of 2 1 0 . 5 ~ 1 .  
Moyle District Council is the smallest local authority with a population of 14,800 and 
expenditure of f1.95m. 
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in their own right, all combined to ensure dramatic changes in the 
political control of several councils. Overall, set against the 1993 
results, the Ulster Unionist Party lost twelve seats and its share of 
the vote dropped 1.5 per cent; the Democratic Unionist Party also 
lost twelve seats and its vote declined by 1.6 per cent; and, the SDLP’s 
vote fell by 1.2 per cent with a loss of seven seats. Meanwhile, the 
surge in support for Sinn Fein continued when it gained 23 seats 
and increased its share of the vote by 4.7 per cent. The fringe loyalist 
parties also made gains. The Progressive Unionist Party, linked to 
the Ulster Volunteer Force, went from one to six seats, and the Ulster 
Democratic Party, which is close to the Ulster Defence Association, 
went from one to four seats. The cross-community parties, Alliance 
and the Women’s Coalition, had a disappointing performance. 
Alliance lost three seats overall (to 41) and its vote share decreased 
by 1.1 per cent (to 6.6 per cent). The Women’s Coalition, fighting 
its first local government elections, fielded 20 candidates but only 
managed to secure one council seat. The mainstream unionist parties 
lost overall control of Belfast, Fermanagh, Cookstown and Strabane 
Councils. Combined unionist parties now control thirteen of the 
26 districts and UUP overall control of Banbridge District Council 
brings this to fourteen. Nationalists, including Sinn Fein, control 
eight councils and SDLP overall control of Down brings this to nine. 
Three councils are effectively deadlocked - Belfast, Dungannon and 
Moyle - (see Table 3). 
Unionists reacted angrily to Sinn Fein’s election performance 
with the UUP leader, David Trimble, calling for a thorough 
investigation into what he described as ‘massive electoral abuse’. 
The chief electoral officer, Pat Bradley, also conceded that, with 
10,000 absent vote applications which appeared to have been filled 
on a ‘production line’, there may have been ‘an orchestrated 
planned campaign of malpractice in voting’. However, he was not 
convinced ‘it was all one-sided’ and called on those making 
allegations to produce evidence (Irish Times and Belfast Telegraph, 
24 May 1997). The DUP complained that Sinn Fein had been 
accorded an unfair high profile on polling day through its well- 
publicized meetings with British officials, sanctioned by Tony Blair, 
to clarify issues surrounding decommissioning. More significantly, 
unionists claimed that the Secretary of State’s visits to nationalist 
residents’ groups throughout the province, in areas of contentious 
Orange Order marches, handed Sinn Fein a major electoral 
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advantage. On Belfast’s Ormeau Road, for example, Dr Mowlam, 
in front of television cameras, flung a friendly arm around Gerard 
Rice, a Sinn Fein member, former IRA prisoner and local residents’ 
leader. Unionists also blamed election fatigue, internal splits 
and feuding within the unionist ‘family’, and apathy on the part 
of their supporters for party under-performance. This was 
compounded by a sense of alienation, they claimed, through the 
policies of the British government, and the perceived futility of 
voting to change them. The growing support for the fringe loyalist 
parties in local government, although confined to certain areas 
(greater Belfast), was seen as evidence of mounting frustration 
with the Ulster Unionists and DUP from the grassroots of 
unionism. 
A high nationalist turnout and a significant transfer of SDLP 
voters to Sinn Fein were attributed to anger over the Drumcree 
issue of July 1996 where the RUC, after a long stand-off with the 
Orange Order accompanied by widespread rioting and disturb- 
ances, forced the marchers through the nationalist Garvaghy Road. 
Moreover, Sinn Fein’s well established ‘common touch’ and adroit 
campaigning on bread-and-butter issues have clearly done much 
to consolidate its core vote. That said, the party did not benefit 
from transfers to the same extent as did the DUP from Ulster 
Unionists, leaving Sinn Fein under-represented in council 
chambers. Hence, Sinn Fein’s 74 seats (on 16.9 per cent of the 
popular vote) represented just 12.7 per cent of the total seats. The 
DUP, with a smaller vote share (15.6 per cent), but benefiting from 
UUP transfers, won 91 seats. Sinn Fein’s performance in Derry 
City Council represented a major symbolic victory where an 
increase of three seats wrested overall control of the council from 
the SDLP. Its coup de grace, however, (given allegations of wide- 
spread electoral malpractice) came in Belfast where the party’s 
increase in seats (from ten to thirteen, and nowjoint largest party 
on the council with the UUP) made electoral history by ending 
unionist hegemony in what is undoubtedly a pillar of unionism, 
leaving the balance of power in the hands of the Alliance Party 
and fringe loyalists. The irony, of course, is that those most 
enthusiastic about the democratic process were supporters of Sinn 
Fein whose commitment to democracy has been, at best, equivocal. 
There was a strong nationalist perception that the British 
government had cynically sabotaged the IRA cease-fire and that, 
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consequently, supporting Sinn Fein still represented the best hope 
for peace. Unionists accused the SDLP of giving legitimacy to Sinn 
Fein by John Hume’s single-handed ongoing collaboration with 
Gerry Adams in furtherance of a cease-fire. Attempts by the SDLP 
to distance itself electorally from Sinn Fein (‘a vote for Sinn Fein 
is a vote of violence’) had proved ineffective with a gap of less 
than 4 per cent between the parties. This caused rancour amongst 
the party’s membership, some of whom vehemently disagreed with 
the leadership’s collaboration tactics with Sinn Fein. 
AN EVALUATION 
Predictably, following the results in Belfast, the first nationalist 
Lord Mayor (Alban Maginness, SDLP) was elected to the City 
Council in its 150-year history, alongside an Ulster Unionist Deputy 
Mayor. Although responsibility-sharing had developed increment- 
ally as trust grew between parties in councils, the addition of Belfast 
to the ranks was significant. The poor media image of local 
government in the past had been largely created by scenes of 
political hostility in Belfast’s council chamber. Local government 
officials in other areas, many of whom were making strenuous 
efforts to raise the profile of their councils through economic 
development, tourism and EU links, felt frustrated by the negative 
antics of Belfast which overshadowed their endeavours. The 
symbolism of a nationalist mayor was captured by an editorial 
describing the event: 
A new era has dawned for Belfast and Northern Ireland with the election 
of the city’s first non-unionist Lord Mayor. It not only reflects a democratic 
change in the electorate, but a reality that has been denied too long. . . 
As the largest city, it helps to set the political agenda for the province 
as a whole, and its influence has not always been good . . . If Belfast Council 
can show the way, producing a city in which all its citizens can take pride 
equally, the effect on the wider political scene could be dramatic. 
(Belfast Telegraph, 25 June 1996) 
The overall pattern of responsibility-sharing changed little with the 
new appointments (mayor/deputy mayor in borough councils and 
chair/vice-chair in district councils) which followed the elections. 
Twelve councils, mainly nationalist or hung councils opted for cross- 
party posts, the exceptions being unionist-controlled Armagh and 
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Lisburn.I6 This confirms the pattern of power-sharing since the mid- 
1980s, with unionists more reluctant to introduce a cross-community 
share-out of top posts. 
Over the last decade, local authorities in Northern Ireland have 
emerged from an era characterized by discrimination and sectarian- 
ism. The future role of councils will be central to the administrative 
arrangements accompanying any constitutional settlement. Various 
suggestions have been made to enhance their existing role. There 
have been calls for both greater devolution of power to local 
government and a new form of regional government. In the former 
case, Archbishop Eames, Church of Ireland Primate, in his 
submission to the Opsahl Commission (a non-governmental forum 
established in February 1993 to elicit community views on the way 
forward) argued for more power to be given to local councils where 
there was evidence of sharing of responsibility. This, in his view, 
would be part of a more systematic progression which entailed ‘slow, 
steady progress in building up inter-community confidence and 
trust.”’ In the latter, Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, former head of the 
Northern Ireland Civil Service, suggested a review in the form of 
Macrory I1.l8 Both alternatives envisage a greater role for local 
government but acknowledge that effective safeguards must exist 
to guard against abuses of power and allay the fears of nationalists. 
Other suggestions include a greater use of district partnerships, set 
up to distribute EC peace and reconciliation funds, in undertaking 
functions currently carried out by the plethora of appointed 
executive quangos, advisory bodies and tribunals, all of which add 
l6 Those councils currently (1997/98) engaged in responsibility sharing are: 
Armagh (SDLP:UU), Belfast (SDLP:UU), Derry (SDLP:DUP), Limavady (SDLP:UU), 
Lisburn (UU:SDLP), Down (SDLP:UU), Dungannon (SDLP:UU), Fermanagh 
(Ind.Nat:DUP), Magherafelt (SF:UU), Moyle (SDLP:UU), Newry and Mourne 
(SDLP:UU) and Omagh (SDLP:UU). 
” R. Eames, ‘Ruthless Loyalists’, Belfast Newsletter, 18 January 1993. 
** In 1969, the Northern Ireland government commissioned a report by Sir Patrick 
Macrory to examine the future of local government in the province. Macrory called 
for a restructuring of Northern Ireland’s system of local government with the 
introduction of a new single tier of district councils to discharge essentially prosaic 
functions such as leisure services, civic and environmental services. Whilst the first 
stage of Macrory was implemented in 1973, with 26 new districts, implementation of 
the full proposals was quickly overtaken by the deteriorating political situation. The 
imposition of Direct Rule (from 1972) effectively stymied the bulk of Macrory’s 
proposals. 
MAKING PROGRESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND? 393 
to the democratic deficit in Northern Ireland. l 9  
There has, however, been a decided reluctance on the part of 
government to tackle the role of councils in isolation, without 
progress on the broader constitutional front. Although welcomed 
by most councillors and officials, the incremental expansion of 
council functions has done no more than tinker at the margins of 
local government. Three related issues may herald a radical rethink 
on the future role of councils in Northern Ireland. First, the renewed 
IRA cease-fire (20 July 1997) and subsequent involvement of Sinn 
Fein in the multi-party talks leading to the Good Friday Agreement 
have broken the impasse on all forms of constitutional change which 
has been in abeyance since the introduction of Direct Rule in 1972 
-what has been described as a state of ‘permanent impermanence’. 
The elections to the new Northern Ireland assembly and the manner 
in which the Assembly chooses to manage its responsibilities will 
bear crucially on this. Secondly, developments in local government 
in the rest of the UK, in particular moves towards unitary authorities 
and the introduction of the concept of ‘best value’, could well provide 
an opportunity for the long anticipated reorganization of 26 small 
Northern Ireland councils into a more efficient tier of government 
with an expanded role. And finally, pressure is growing (aided 
nationally by the impact of the work of the Committee on Standards 
in Public Life under Lord Nolan’s chairmanship and, locally, by the 
appointment of Sir Len Peach as the Commissioner for Public 
Appointments in Northern Ireland) to dismantle the worst excesses 
of the quango state which have had a disproportionate impact in 
Northern Ireland. In the absence of alternative institutional 
arrangements, controversial functions (e.g. fair employment, local 
government staffing procedures) were hived off to non-departmental 
public bodies. Their burgeoning growth has accentuated a system 
of governance already suffering from problems of political 
accountability, openness and accessibility. Taken together, it is 
inevitable that these issues will create additional momentum for a 
radical rethink of the structure and role of local government in 
Northern Ireland. 
l9 P. Sweeney, Achieving a More Participative and Inclusive Form of Democracy in 
Northern Ireland’, Review of Northern Ireland Administrative Arrangements, Belfast, Chief 
Executives’ Forum/Joseph Rowntree, 1997. 
